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The following reflections on the strengthening of democracy through the exercise of 
political responsibility are based on the analyses of Hannah Arendt. She, perhaps better 
than anyone, understood the importance of politics understood as the collective action of 
the citizens, aimed at the preservation of the public realm. Faced with the delegitimation 
of political systems and parties, the corruption that affects many governments, and the 
indifference, if not the discrediting of citizen action, many voices have spoken out in favor 
of returning to the refuge of the private.. Thus, the realm of politics and of the public ends 
up as barren territory that may be occupied by destructive or anti-political forces. In those 
situations that Arendt described as “dark times”, that is, times “in which the public realm 
has been obscured and the world become so dubious that people have ceased to ask any 
more of politics than that it show due consideration for their vital interests”1, the only 
solution is to resort to the exercise of participative citizen action and to shared public 
discourse. In acting and deliberating together with others, we establish important 
connections that do not rely on the agreement achieved, but rather on the feeling of 
jointly supporting the world we share, the public space in which we express ourselves and 
show ourselves to others. 
On the other hand, in these times of darkness in which the undermining of the public 
realm and violence are evident, it is also necessary to consider our individual and collec- 
tive responsibility, in our duty to maintain and preserve our common world. This is a task 
that is oriented both toward the past, insofar as we are the recipients of a legacy expressed 
in the form of the memory of events and of the stories that built the public realm we now 
inhabit, and toward the future, insofar as we must preserve a public sphere that makes it 
actually possible for citizen action to manifest itself, is not undermined by violence, and 
allows the expression of human plurality. As we shall see, this responsibility entails, above 
all, a negative mandate: it is our duty to prevent evil2 Thus, we are responsible for that 
which we were or are unable to prevent, and this forms part of our duty to the world: not 
just to the community we belong to but to humanity itself.  
Just as moral and political questions regarding responsibility arose during the times of 
totalitarian violence, they reappear today when we are faced with situations of violence 
that jeopardize the shared public realm: armed interventions, assassinations of political 
enemies, and state violence, as well as situations of social and political exclusion that are 
met mostly with indifference: for example, the situations of those marginalized in pockets 
1 Hannah Arendt: Hombres en tiempos de oscuridad, Barcelona: Gedisa, 1989
2 Hannah Arendt: “Responsabilidad colectiva”, in: Hannah Arendt: Responsabilidad y juicio, Barcelona: 
Paidós, 2007, p. 156 
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of poverty, displaced populations, those who arrive at the barriers of our borders....to 
name a few. These are all old and new forms of harm that put our responsibility into 
question. For this reason, Hannah Arendt’s ideas help us reflect about citizen 
responsibility in the face of violence, while bearing in mind that the survival democratic 
public spaces is precarious, since even in today’s societies, it is possible to find, albeit in a 
latent state, some of the elements that made possible the rise of totalitarianism. As Arendt 
reminds us “totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the 
form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate 
political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man.”3
It should not come as a surprise that Hannah Arendt’s ideas regarding responsibility, 
just as those of some of her contemporaries, appeared at the time of the moral and 
political breakdown caused by World War II. In 1946, Jaspers published a classical essay 
on the subject: The Question of German Guilt4, in which he set forth the degrees of 
culpability of Germany and of the Germans in the conflict. On the other hand, others, like 
Heidegger, allowed themselves to be captivated by the totalitarian regime and turned 
away from the pain of others. As Arendt ironically points out, “the question at that time 
was not what our enemies were doing, but what our friends were doing.” Arendt speaks 
about collective moral and political responsibility, that is, the anonymous complicity of 
the citizens, and about individual moral responsibility. Like Jaspers, she rejects the 
notion of collective criminal or moral guilt. Guilt, like innocence, is always individual, and 
is attributed to an individual for his or her actions or omissions. In this sense, guilt has a 
strong solipsistic orientation (toward the individual himself); it singles out and is strictly 
personal. In the case analyzed by Arendt, that of Germany’s involvement in the Holocaust, 
it does not make sense to insist on the collective guilt of Germany, but rather on the 
identification and subsequent trial of the guilty individuals, as was the case in the 
Nüremberg trials. However, responsibility does have a strong intersubjective component: 
one is always accountable to someone or to a group. For this reason, the question that 
immediately arises is: Who are we accountable to? For Arendt, the answer is that we are 
accountable to ourselves in the first place, but that we are also accountable to those with 
whom we share a common public space regarding the preservation of that common world. 
Unlike guilt, responsibility can be collective; this is what we call vicarious responsibility, 
that is, responsibility for an action that one has not committed, that was committed in our 
name, and which we are responsible for given that we belong to a specific community.5 
Thus, according to Arendt, the political (vicarious) responsibility of governments entails 
“assuming responsibility for the good and bad actions of their predecessors”; likewise, we 
can also speak of a collective political and moral (but never legal) responsibility “for the 
sins of our fathers, much as we reap the rewards of their merits, but we are of course not 
guilty of their misdeeds, either morally or legally, nor can we ascribe their deeds to our 
own merits”6. That vicarious responsibility is the price we pay for living in a community.7 
3 Hannah Arendt: Los orígenes del totalitarismo, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981 
4 Karl Jaspers: El problema de la culpa, Barcelona: Paidós, 1998 
5 In this regard, see the analysis of vicarious responsibility in H.L.A. Hart: “Responsibility and Retribution”, in: 
Hart: Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Clarendon, 1959 
6 Hannah Arendt: “Responsabilidad colectiva”, op. cit., p. 153 
7 Likewise, Karl Jaspers points out: "There is a sort of collective moral guilt in a people’s way of life which I 
share as an individual and from which grow political realities. For political conditions are inseparable from a 
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For this reason, the only way to escape that responsibility would be not to belong to any 
community, to be an isolated Robinson Crusoe. At the other extreme, it would imply 
being a stateless person or a refugee, that is, to have been expelled from some community, 
which would lead us to affirm, with Arendt, that stateless persons are absolutely innocent, 
an innocence for which the very high price of not being able to enjoy any social, political, 
or legal recognition has been paid. 
Nevertheless, there is also a collective moral and political responsibility that is 
associated with the anonymous tolerant complicity with violence and terror, which 
promotes or tolerates collective subjection to a dictator, complicity with socially extended 
and accepted evil, a violence that has become commonplace and quotidian, characterized 
by acquiescent and anonymous participation. For Jaspers, the recognition of this 
responsibility is the first step in the construction of a new collective future, and the 
starting point in order to assume that responsibility is, as Arendt points out, the exercise 
of the faculty of judgment.
The issue of collective responsibility in the face of violence is a classical one among 
Holocaust scholars. Between the victims and the perpetrators, represented by the political 
elites, is the anonymous mass of bystanders, indifferent or complacent with respect to 
terror, those “ordinary men” who did nothing to oppose it.8 On the other hand, with 
respect to this issue, Arendt distinguishes three degrees of responsibility with respect to 
the rise of Nazism: those she considers “responsible in a broader sense” or the “co-
responsible irresponsible”9, represented by those who contributed to the rise of Hitler, the 
sympathizers of the regime, those who applauded, supported, and voted, those who, like, 
Heidegger “demonstrated their incapacity to judge the political organizations of their 
time” and who “in a broad sense were co-responsible for Hitler’s crimes10. But for Arendt, 
this conn-  vance and generalized acceptance is not too different from that support which 
can be given to other tyrannical regimes. In her view, what turned out to be totally new 
and terrifying was the participation “of a whole people in the vast machine of 
administrative mass murder”11, in such a way that “everyone is either an executioner, or a 
victim, or an automaton, marching onward over the corpses of his comrades”. According 
to Arendt, making the majority participants and responsible parties as cogs in an 
enormous death machine constituted the triumph of the totalitarian regime, and, in this 
sense, what the Nazi leaders understood perfectly was that to achieve that participation 
and responsibility of the majority they did not need born killers nor convinced 
people’s whole way of life. There is no absolute division of politics and human existence as long as man is 
realizing an existence rather than perishing in eremitical seclusion”. El problema de la culpa, op. cit. p. 91
8 In this respect, see the classical study of the German situation by Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men. 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (Aquellos hombres grises. El batallón 101 y la  
solución final en Polonia, Madrid: Edhasa, 2002). We can also say that to a great extent, studies of the 
Holocaust have shifted their focus of interest: from the organizational structures to the role played by 
bystanders. Thus, works such as that of Goldhagen concentrate on these aspects of collective responsibility 
(although Goldhagen is actually not very clear regarding the distinction between guilt and responsibility), 
while that of Robert Gellatelly Not Only Hitler, focuses on the participation of the Germans in the 
implementation of terror against the Jews.  
9 Hannah Arendt: “Culpa organizada y responsabilidad universal”, in Ensayos sobre la comprensión,  Madrid: 
Ed. Caparrós 2005, p. 158
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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accomplices, or even convinced Nazis, but merely efficient officers and good family men, 
the paterfamilias,  concerned exclusively about the preservation of their private sphere.  
What Arendt emphasizes, then, is the emergence of a type of evil, as a deeply 
contemporary phenomenon that is not exclusively German, an evil exercised by an 
efficient subject and good family man. In 1963, in her report on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann, Arendt introduces the concept of the “banality of evil” to define that eminently 
modern type of evil that gave rise to so many controversies and misunderstandings, an 
evil that is rooted in the lack of discernment, in the incapacity to stop and think. What we 
can ask ourselves now is: What social mechanisms fostered the increase of these 
unthinking subjects in the vast whole of a society? That anonymous complicity expressed 
itself in what we could call a collective banal evil, which was possible thanks to certain 
characteristics inherent to modern societies – although they were more evident in 
German society – which made collective banality feasible. Therefore, we could say that 
certain tendencies in contemporary societies, facilitate or foster the appearance of that 
collective banal evil. Among these tendencies, Arendt fundamentally highlights the lack of 
concern of the good bourgeois about public life and his isolation in his private interests. 
In this sense, Himmler would be, according to Arendt, the artificer of a vast 
administrative death machine that took advantage of that “decline of public man”, by 
incorporating the characteristics of that type of bourgeois: docility, conformism, and his 
concern, as a good paterfamilias, for the security of his family at whatever price: a man 
like that “was ready to sacrifice everything -beliefs, honor, dignity”12. In situations in 
which the bourgeois sees the comfort of his existence threatened, he may turn into the 
“desktop assassin” that prepares the schedules of the trains bound for Auschwitz, betrays 
his neighbors, or classifies corpses. In order to illustrate her point, Arendt tells the story 
of the significant encounter between a Jewish man released from the Buchenwald camp 
and a former schoolmate of his who was then a member of the SS: “Spontaneously, the 
man stared at remarked: You must understand, I have five years of unemployment behind 
me. They can do anything they want with me”13.
For Arendt, the bourgeois is contemporary mass man, isolated in the comfort and 
security of his own private sphere, or as we would probably say today, protected by the 
walls of his condominium and observing the menacing outside world through his home’s 
security cameras. The citizen is the opposite of the bourgeois in that he or she is actively 
committed to the world and to public interests, which are clearly differentiated from 
private interests. In contrast with this public man, Arendt sees in the bourgeois and his 
ignorance of all civic virtues the suitable culture medium for a social and political 
conformism that is typical of contemporary mass societies. Together with that lack of a 
shared common world, another factor that makes possible the rise of collective banality is 
isolation understood as one of the symptoms of contemporary societies.14 Mass-man lives 
in isolation, secluded in “the sad opacity of his private life”, immersed in moral and 
political solipsism. To a great extent, the triumph of totalitarianism in Europe was 
12 Ibid., p. 162 
13 Ibid. 
14 In terms that are very similar to Arendt’s, Italian writer Alberto Moravia describes the protagonist of his 
novel The Conformist, written in 1951, as a man who, in the context of Italian Fascism, seeks desperately to 
do what the rest of society is doing, blending into the mass and displaying a great moral indifference.  
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possible because society was made up of isolated individuals, without any social or 
political links among themselves: “Only isolated individuals can be totally dominated”. 
Hitler was able to build his organization on the firm ground of an already atomized 
society that he then artificially atomized even further. The terms “atomized society” and 
“isolated individuals” refer to a state of things in which people live together without 
having anything in common, without sharing any visible or tangible part of the world”15. 
This isolation, “the disease of our time”, which totalitarianism regimes knew how to use in 
their favor, facilitated the destruction of the public sphere and the expansion of 
mechanisms to exercise control over individuals whose only reference to the world was 
themselves. 
Studies of the Holocaust, as well as social psychology studies, have analyzed, in terms 
similar to those used by Arendt, the importance of isolation and the rupture of social 
bonds as key factors to understand the mechanisms for the social production of moral 
indifference toward the other. In this context, Stanley Milgram’s studies on unquestioning 
obedience to authority and acceptance of the harm inflicted have become classics.16 What 
Milgram's analysis demonstrated was that moral inhibitions against violence increase 
when such violence is authorized by a person or group of persons endowed with legal, 
social, political, or scientific authority, when violent actions are inserted into a 
bureaucratic routine created by government regulations and by the precise delimitation of 
duties, and when the victims of that violence have been dehumanized (by being deprived 
of their individual traits and rights, through the use of animal metaphors, etc.). In sum, 
before physical violence is exercised over the victims, the latter are expelled from what we 
call “the universe of moral obligations”17, that is, mutual obligations of help and respect. 
When we are unable to recognize in those potential victims what binds us to them and we 
only see in them the most absolute altered, their moral invisibility arises. Additionally, the 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out something important with respect to the 
role of bureaucracy in the negation of the other: strictly bureaucratic solutions to 
situations of social exclusion increase moral invisibility. This is so, firstly because in the 
bureaucratic chain there is no responsibility of each one of the intervening agents, given 
that the division of labor makes it impossible to see the final result. In the second place, 
potential moral dilemmas disappear from sight in the context of an infinite chain of 
independent actions. This also increases the physical and psychological distance between 
the agent and the potential victim. We are unable to see the victim. For this reason, some 
contemporary ethical proposals, such as those of Emmanuel Lévinas, appeal to an “ethics 
of the face”, to an ethics of a face-to-face encounter in which the other is a figure of the 
bareness of humanity that appeals to our responsibility: “Since the Other looks at me, I 
am responsible for him”.18
Therefore, if evil can be understood as taking moral distance from the pain of others, it 
is valid to ask ourselves about individual responsibility regarding that pain. Arendt 
examines this question in her 1964 article “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship”, a 
15 Hannah Arendt:“De la naturaleza del totalitarismo. Ensayo de comprensión”, in: Ensayos sobre la  
comprensión, op. cit. p. 429
16 Stanley Milgram: Obedience to Authority,, New York: Tavistock, 1974
17 Helen Fein: Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, New York: Sage, 1993
18  mmanuel Levinas: Ética e infinito, Madrid: Ed. Antonio Machado, 2000, p. 80 
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question that is closely related to her reflections on the banality of evil in the context of 
the Adolf Eichmann trial.19
What Arendt detects are the “traps” or excuses we find when dealing with questions of 
responsibility. Surely the first thing we would have to point out is that speaking of 
individual responsibility is something that is, in principle, uncomfortable; nobody wants 
to accept responsibilities, but rather to evade them. And the arguments used to justify 
that moral evasion of responsibility are many, as Arendt says. We have those who point 
out the impossibility of resisting any type of temptation, whether bribes or privileges, so 
that, the promise of a better job, of getting to keep the property of the Jew one has 
denounced, or of receiving money covertly would function as excuses for moral exemption 
from responsibility. Nevertheless, this type of argument cannot in any way be a moral 
justification of the deed, since we would be forgetting that there are other alternatives for 
action, even though they might satisfy the selfish calculations of the agent in question to a 
lesser extent. Perhaps it might be worth recalling, together with Primo Levi, the tragic 
story of Chaim Rumkowski, president of the Jewish Council of the Polish ghetto of Lodz, 
who had absolute power over the life and death of his fellow Jews and who, in spite of the 
privileges he had been offered, also ended up in a concentration camp. As Levi reminds 
us: 
“Like Rumkowski, we too are so dazzled by power and prestige as to forget our 
essential fragility. Willingly or not we come to terms with power, forgetting that we 
are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is walled in, that outside the ghetto reign the 
lords of death, and that close by the train is waiting.”
Another one of the arguments commonly used, and which was in fact used in Eichmann’s 
defense, is the so-called cog theory, which evades responsibility by arguing that 
individuals are but a small cog in the machinery of a vast system, whether military, 
bureaucratic, Mafia or political machinery-related, etc. This type of justification actually 
constitutes a petitio principii, which leads to the existence of a primary responsible party 
who would totally bear the weight of responsibility (and of guilt, in this case), thus 
exonerating the rest of the members of the system from that responsibility.  In this way, in 
the case of Germany, Hitler would be the only responsible party, a fact that would 
undoubtedly be more reassuring if we accepted it. A variation of this argument is that 
which blames History or certain historical events, thus diluting responsibility in the 
inevitable course of History: Hitler as the heir to nihilism or to the Versailles Treaty, the 
Germans as victims of the Crash of 1929, and so forth. But what Eichmann’s lawyers 
seemed to forget when using these types of arguments to exempt the defendant from 
responsibility was that courts do not try a system, or a historical trend, nor anti-Semitism, 
in this case. They try an individual, and as Arendt reminds us, “in most criminal 
organizations, the small cogs are actually committing the big crimes”.20
Another type of argument used to exonerate someone from responsibility is that of the 
lesser evil: faced with two evils, one should opt for the lesser one. Arendt radically 
19 Included in the cited work, Responsabilidad y juicio 
20Hannah Arendt: “Responsabilidad personal bajo una dictadura”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, op. cit., p. 60 
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opposes this thesis by reminding us that in choosing the lesser evil, we are forgetting that 
we are in fact choosing evil. This argument, aimed at getting the population to accept evil 
as such as the only possible scenario, is precisely one of the techniques used by 
totalitarian governments to spread terror, criminality, and complicity with its crimes. 
Furthermore, the lesser evil argument is usually preceded by an escalation of evil, in 
practice; for example, the acceptance of measures considered to be “minor”, as was the 
case in Germany during the early stages of the Nazi regime: the expulsion of the Jews 
from social life in order to guarantee the “security” of the rest of the population, or the 
enactment of the Nuremberg laws, measures that were in this case legal and that 
contributed to the radicalization and acceptance of terror. The lesser evil argument is 
often used as a synonym of guaranteeing the security of the population in the face of 
greater evils or artificially created fears, thus ensuring the impunity of those who commit 
acts of violence and achieving the complicity of the population. 
What all these arguments aimed at the evasion of responsibility show us, according to 
Arendt, is the fear and incapacity to judge our actions and those of others. Indeed, the 
widespread use of the common expression, “Who am I to judge?” does not seem to 
express a sudden majority interest in respecting the privacy of others, in the style of 
classical liberalism.  Rather, as Arendt points out, what it actually suggests is something 
that is cause for concern: the acknowledgment of the incapacity to distinguish between 
good and evil, to exercise the faculty of judgment.  But, additionally, our unwillingness to 
judge is also due to a strong relativistic prejudice: I cannot put myself in the other’s shoes; 
I cannot think otherness, an otherness that the corresponding political system has already 
presented not as evidence of pluralism, but rather as an otherness in which we cannot 
recognize the human.
The ability to judge, to discern, is indissolubly linked to the ability to think. To think 
means “to examine and to question”21. But, in addition, there are maxims for the 
application of judgment: 1) thinking on your own, that is, thinking independently, 
emancipated from the tutelage of others and of pre-judices. 2) always thinking in 
conformity with yourself (a consistent way of thinking), and 3) thinking from the 
perspective of the other, that is, putting ourselves in the position of the others, 
representing their possible opinions to ourselves. The latter is what Arendt, following 
Kant, calls representative thinking or enlarged mentality, which entails a moral attitude of 
mutual respect and recognition of the others, that is, egalitarian reciprocity. Judgment is, 
therefore, intersubjective, since it requires the presence of others and necessarily takes 
place within a public and critical space. Through the exercise of critical judgment we 
create ties with others by putting ourselves in their place. This is why, for Arendt, 
representative thinking is the political way of thinking par excellence. In judging we 
recognize ourselves as equals, creating a community of understanding that does not 
necessarily lead to consensus, in which we know, deliberate, judge, and assume our 
responsibilities. In doing so, we must take the others into account by representing their 
positions to ourselves. 
The inability to think and exercise judgment is what Arendt called the banality of evil. 
In using this controversial description, Arendt did not mean to say, as some have 
21 Hannah Arendt: “Algunas cuestiones de filosofía moral”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, op. cit., p. 117
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misinterpreted, that the harm caused had been trivial, but rather that the most atrocious 
acts need not be caused for specifically evil purposes, but are rather the result of the 
incapacity to think, especially the incapacity to think from the point of view of the other 
person. The individual who causes this type of banal evil is an especially terrifying 
character since he combines apparent normality with the total absence from the world of 
others. Adolf Eichmann was not the sadist or the villain that the people attending the trial 
would have liked to find. On the contrary, he was a “terribly and terrifyingly normal” 
person, who was unable to put himself in the position of those individuals he sent on the 
trains bound for Auschwitz, or to establish ties of moral recognition of the other. The 
banal perpetrator is capable of committing evil deeds because he does not reflect on the 
regulations, customs, practices, or orders that cause harm; he accepts them without 
exercising independent thinking, or, to put it in Kantian terms, without the subject’s 
having been able to put into practice the maxim: “Dare to think”. Arendt clearly points out 
the dangers of this lack of reflection:
“When people are removed from the dangers of critical examination, they are taught 
to adhere immediately to any of the rules of conduct that are prevalent in a given 
society. What people get used to is not so much the content of the rules – a detailed 
examination of them would leave them perplexed- as the possession of rules under 
which to subsume particulars. In other words, they get used to never making up their 
minds” (Thinking and Moral Considerations)
Independently of whether the actual individual, Eichmann, fits this description, which is 
problematic, we can say that the banality of evil is exercised by a subject that, in Norbert 
Bilbeny’s words, we could refer to as a moral idiot (from the Greek term, idiotes), that is, a 
morally apathetic individual who lives in isolation from others, enclosed in himself, in his 
privacy, concerned only about himself, and incapable of thinking about the others.22 Upon 
observing Eichmann’s conduct during the trial, Arendt described him in the following 
terms: “No communication was possible with him, not because he lied, but because he 
was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against words and the presence of 
others, and hence against reality as such”.23 The totalitarian system had triumphed by 
instilling the dangers of critical examination in an entire society, and the citizens had 
become used to not making moral decisions and not thinking.
However, in situations of generalized and accepted violence, we also find dissidents 
who refuse to collaborate. In this respect, Arendt asks herself about the types of moral 
arguments they used to justify their conduct. The non-participants, in this sense, were the 
only ones who dared judge by themselves. They were those who had doubts about the 
traditional moral rules, the skeptics. They did not dispose of a better system of values. 
They did not automatically pre-judge. They were neither among the most educated 
individuals, nor did they belong to a specific social class (let us recall the Heidegger case). 
What led them not to participate was a secular moral argument that is expressed in the 
Socratic maxim according to which “it is preferable to suffer injustice than to commit 
22Norbert Bilbeny: El idiota moral, Barcelona: Anagrama, 1994
23 Hannah Arendt: Eichmann en Jerusalen. Un estudio sobre la banalidad del mal, Barcelona: Lumen, 2003, p. 
78
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injustice”. And the reason for that preference, manifested in the refusal to commit 
wrongs, is that otherwise those individuals would not have been able to live with 
themselves, since this would imply living with the wrongdoer or the assassin they would 
have turned into. In other words, I cannot do certain things because, once I do them, I 
will not be able to live in peace with myself.24 In the end, the moral issue of “What should 
I do?” depends on what I decide about myself; thus, it is here a question of self-imposed 
limits. Arendt is quite aware of the fact that that the Socratic type of moral proposed is a 
moral for times of crisis, for limit-situations. We could then ask ourselves what it is that 
characterizes those limit-situations, those exceptional moral and political situations. 
Undoubtedly, the answer is that those situations are marked by the existence of violence, 
by the threat of violence against public space and the shared world we have created 
through our actions and deliberations. Morally speaking, in the face of violence, the only 
solution is to reject it and not participate in its acceptance. It is in these extreme 
situations that individual responsibility acquires its strength and meaning. As Arendt 
says, “it is these limit-situations that best provide clarity about issues that would 
otherwise remain obscure and equivocal”25.
Thus, it is not appropriate to speak about “obedience” (a term that would only be 
appropriate in the domain of religion) with respect to moral and political issues. 
Consequently, the question addressed to those who participated should not be Why did 
you obey? but rather Why did you support? Arriving at the maxim that it is better to 
suffer wrong than to do wrong is only possible through the exercise of the capacity to 
think. Those whom society often calls “good” or “respectable” people are not precisely 
those moral dissidents that we are referring to. On the contrary, as Arendt points out, 
those respectable people are those who constantly appeal to elevated moral principles and 
adhere to any moral norm available to them (the important thing is to “have principles”, 
the habit of holding fast to something) without exercising the faculty of judgment. Thus, 
Arendt tells us that those  least inclined to think and judge were generally those who were 
most willing to obey; those who most firmly held fast to the old moral code prevailing 
before Nazism were also the most anxious to assimilate the new Nazi moral code.26 And, 
as we know, moral standards can be changed overnight and replaced by others, even if the 
new ones are devoid of content. Let us recall, in this respect, that the motto that prevailed 
in Auschwitz was: “There is only one road to freedom. Its milestones are: obedience, hard 
work, honesty, order, cleanliness, sobriety, uprightness, and a sense of sacrifice and love 
of the Fatherland.” This is a motto that could well be taken up nowadays by political 
parties and a good part of respectable society. 
In Nazi Germany, only those who withdrew completely from public life or refused to go 
on having an active role in public life were able to avoid being implicated in crimes. At 
this point it is worth making reference to the story narrated by the German historian and 
writer, Joachim Fest with respect to non-participation in the Nazi regime as a moral 
attitude, given its profoundly Arendtian meaning.27 Fest’s father was a professor who 
belonged to the German bourgeoisie and who would be removed from public office under 
24Hannah Arendt: “Responsabilidad personal bajo una dictadura”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, p. 71
25 Hannah Arendt: “Responsabilidad colectiva”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, p. 158
26Hannah Arendt: “Algunas cuestiones de filosofía moral”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, p. 118 
27 Joachim Fest: Yo no, Madrid: Taurus, 2007
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suspicion of carrying out “activities hostile to the state”, and refusing to recant his 
opinions about the government.  His opposition to the regime brought about the family’s 
financial ruin and a long series of economic and social hardships. Additionally, he taught 
his children to reject evil, to reject a regime based on lies, as a moral attitude: he made 
them write and always keep with them a sentence from the Gospels: “Even if all others 
participate, I will not” (Etiam si omnes, ego non). This “I will not” set itself up as a banner 
in the face of complacent acquiescence and moral lethargy. As a moral maxim, this “I will 
not” perfectly illustrates the exercise of the capacity to think and judge, the possibility of 
dissent in the face of violence. I believe it is essential to highlight the relevance of that “I 
will not” in the exercise of our individual responsibility when faced with situations of 
violence and exclusion: even though others may collaborate with the institutionalization 
of violence, I will not; even though others may try to bury the crimes in oblivion, I will 
not. It is additionally necessary to emphasize the transition from the individual “I will 
not” to the collective “We will not”. This would entail what Arendt describes as the 
creation of a shared, collective power, a sense of collective citizen responsibility that 
would lead to a robust civil society from the moral and political point of view. We can cite 
some recent examples of the “we will not” in the face of violence, in which citizens rise up 
with a collective consciousness of responsibility, such as the massive citizen resistance 
demonstrations throughout Europe against military intervention in Iraq. But I especially 
think about the reactions of citizenship in Spain in the case of the kidnapping and 
subsequent assassination by the terrorist group ETA of Popular Party councilman, Miguel 
Ángel Blanco, in 1997. The massive demonstrations held all over Spain not only 
repudiated such a ferocious irruption of violence in everyday political life in the form of 
exchanging democratic consensus for arms, but also marked the beginning of the end of 
moral lethargy regarding terrorism, that is, turning one’s head in the other direction. The 
citizens exercised their moral and political responsibility, without delegating the task to 
the political parties, and exercised their moral option to repudiate violence and cease to 
be anonymous accomplices or silent and indifferent witness. 
Following Arendt, we could then ask ourselves about the path that leads us to affirm 
that “we will not” as a moral maxim:
In the first place, it entails teaching people how to think, not what to think (Socrates). 
To think is to examine and to question. Thinking must display a critical role with respect 
to acquired truths. To think is also, as we have seen, to put ourselves in the position of 
others, making them present at the moment of making decisions or acting. 
Secondly, it involves cultivating common sense, understood not as a sense that is 
common to all persons, but as a sensus communalis that integrates us into a community 
together with other people and makes us members of that community. For this reason, 
the exercise of common sense requires a public space in which it may develop. Common 
sense triggers the imagination by making present all those who are absent from the 
community: Jews, immigrants, and those excluded by violence. This is precisely what it 
means to have an enlarged mentality: to put ourselves in the place of the other.
In the third place, it is necessary to create and preserve public spaces for deliberation. 
Arendt insisted on the fact that one of the conditions for totalitarianism is the previous 
destruction of the public sphere through the severing of citizens’ political ties, thus 
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turning them into isolated individuals. The weakening of the public sphere hinders the 
exercise of both individual and collective responsibility, and fosters the appearance of 
banal evil.
If the question of moral and political responsibility leads us to ask ourselves what our 
conduct should be in the face of evil (in the face of wrongs done to others and with respect 
to their suffering), we should ask ourselves, again with Arendt, what wrongs we can cause 
by not assuming responsibility. Her answer in this respect is clear:
“The greatest evildoers are those who do not remember because they have never 
given thought to the matter, and nothing can keep them back because without 
remembrance they are without roots. Thinking and remembering are the human way 
of striking roots, of taking one’s place in the world.”28
Arendt seems to suggest that evil is linked to both the absence of thinking (the banality 
of evil) and the incapacity to keep thinking linked to memory, to the stories that 
constitute our collective, not individual, memory. This remembering, this memory, thus 
refers us to the existence of a critical public space that acts as the guardian of memory, the 
memory of suffering and wrongs, so that they never repeat themselves. Thus, we can say 
that if there is public memory of the harm and of the victims of violence, we shall not only 
be providing symbolic reparation to the victims, but also facilitating the identification of 
that type of wrong or evil. Thus, it becomes a collective responsibility of civil society, of 
the political agents, to keep alive that memory of evil.
To conclude, we will be able to strengthen democracy as an institution and as a political 
culture through the politics of collective deliberation, together with a citizenry that 
exercises collective responsibility, that assumes responsibility for their actions in the 
context of community life, while at the same time demanding accountability from the 
governing class as an essential part of the contract of representation.
28Hannah Arendt: “Algunas cuestiones sobre filosofía moral”, in: Responsabilidad y juicio, p. 111
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